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TO : ADSO

3 June 1949

FROM : TRS

SUBJECT: OSO-OPC Training

25X1 1. [] has conveyed to me your desire to have my written recommendations concerning the present OSO-OPC training problems. The attached paper contains in essence my views, though I would make a few minor changes were I rewriting it now. For instance, Assessment should be added as a responsibility of the Training Staff.

2. I recommend that this attached paper be presented to the Director as a basis for further discussion. Admittedly it is all in favor of OSO. I believe, however, that it is time that OSO began to assert its competence, longer experience, and genuine strength. If we do not, we will be constantly forced to compromise, and in compromising we will slowly lose control not only of our training but also of our operations.

3. Since OPC was first set up, the OSO Training Staff has been squarely in the middle. We had, after several difficult years, developed an excellent training program, manned, for the most part, by competent and experienced men and women. Yet we were barely strong enough to handle the OSO training job; in fact, we had delayed some badly needed new courses through lack of strength. We were then told to "assist" OPC in its development by giving that office all the training support possible, consistent with our personnel strength and facilities. In actual fact, if we had followed that principle to the letter, we would have given no help to OPC. Every OPC student we have handled, every hour spent conferring with OPC on training problems, has to that extent lessened the quality of training given to OSO students.

4. All of us on the Training Staff, however, though loyal to OSO, are also members of CIA and sincerely believe that OSO and OPC are engaged in a common cause. We further believe that the kind of training given new employees has great bearing on the future efficiency of the organization. We therefore have strained our abilities and facilities to the breaking point in order to help OPC establish a competent headquarters staff and training staff. Unfortunately, we have neither satisfied OPC completely nor maintained the previous high level of OSO training.

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5. As Chief of OSO Training, I have felt I had a responsibility to train OPC personnel but I have had no authority over OPC training and no increase in my staff. I hope soon to be relieved of my present duties to go to the field. I should like to leave to my successor a well-organized, competent staff, with a clearly defined relationship to OPC. I believe that the proposal in the attached paper will do that.

6. However, should the proposal that OSO be given the entire responsibility appear too unfavorable to OPC, I propose the following:

a. A Chief of Training, to be in charge of all OSO and OPC training, will be appointed by the ADSO, with the concurrence of the DCI and the ADPC, and will be carried on the OSO T/O.

b. Under this Chief would be two Deputies, one for OSO training, one for OPC training. These Deputies would be appointed by the ADSO and ADPC respectively, would be carried on the T/O's of the respective Offices, and, with the Chief, would form a small committee to handle problems of mutual interest.

c. Under this superstructure would be the various units to handle Headquarters, Covert, Area (Paramilitary), and Administrative Training. Assessment would be an additional unit.

d. The T/O and operating expenses exclusive of personnel salaries would be equally divided between OSO and OPC. However, the operating expenses and T/O for Area training would be completely OPC's.

e. While a divided T/O, with divided loyalties, has disadvantages, this plan would give unified control over staff and facilities with resulting economies. Also, both OSO and OPC could run segregated courses in highly-classified techniques through their Deputies on the Training Staff. Furthermore, should either OSO or OPC be removed from CIA, a capable training staff would be available for completely independent use. However, should OSO and OPC come closer together, complete merger of the staff could easily be effected.

f. The justification for making the Chief an OSO man is, first, the greater maturity of OSO;

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second, the fact that the heart of both OSO and OPC activities is, and will remain, agent operations, in which OSO will continue to have greater competence.

7. If neither of the above plans is acceptable, I see no other solution than complete separation of the two Training Staffs. Possibly a few programs could be run jointly on a quid pro quo basis. These might be Basic Training, Administrative and Orientation, Covert Training (Basic operating techniques only), and Foreign Service Institute liaison. This approach is what we have already attempted. I can assure you that to date, OSO Training has been giving - not getting. This approach, because of lack of central authority, is time-consuming and indecisive, leading to endless committee meetings that can solve little.

8. To me, OSO-OPC training relationships are dependent largely upon OSO-OPC relationships generally. I am not sure that we can go further toward "joint" training activities than the two offices do in their planning and operational activities. However, I feel that unless OSO Training helps OPC in its build-up phase, we can justly be accused of non-cooperation. If we fail to cooperate, I fear we will be removed from OSO and be forced to assume the OPC training job. Frankly, my analysis of OPC's training situation is that they are desperate. They have a T/O of some [] most of whom must be recruited and trained over the next two years, yet their training staff is purely in embryo - it will be months, if not a full year, before it is capable of doing even a partial job. This fact explains their pressure on the OSO Training Staff - a pressure which, I assure you, is seriously hurting the efficiency of OSO training. Hence my desire to reach some solution soon.

9. My suggestion is that the DCI be presented with the problem as soon as possible. I am afraid that the Joint OSO-OPC Training Committee can not solve the problem.

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Chief, TRS

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